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Many of my diems, both domestic 
and international, view bankruptcy as a 
black box. A company goes into bank-
ruptcy, and, perhaps~ some years later 
emerges in a reorganized form. Some 
unfortunate companies, not possessing 
the proper talisman, never emerge at all 
from the black box. This article is an 
attempt to separate fact from myth by 
explaining the overall principles of a 
business reorganization in bankruptcy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S .• business bankruptcy is 
generally governed by a federal legal 
code and can take the Corm of either a 
Chapter 7 case or a Chapter 11 ca~. A 
. Chapter 7 case ordinarily results in m 
liquidation of the company and. Coo· 
that reason. is not very interesting. 
Most major companies do not liquidate 
in bankruptcy. Indeed, a company that 
is forced into a Chapter 7 case has the 
absolute legal right to convert the case 
to a Chapter 1i.1 
A Chapter 11 case is the basis of 
business reorganization in bankruptcy. 
Once II Chapter 11 case begins. the 
company's creditors will organize. 
under the supervision of a federal 
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bankruptcy trustee, into one or more 
comminees (each a cre:ditors' commit-
tee) for the purpose of negotiating with 
the company. 
The company that is the subject of a 
Chapter J J case is referred to as the 
debtor. The creditors' comminee and 
the debtor negotiate the majoll' actions 
that the debtor must take to reduce 
operaling costs, sell unnecessary assets 
where appropriate, and eventually 
compromise on a plan (called II plan of 
reorganization) by which the debtor is 
reorganized as a viable business cor-
poration that no longer needs the pro-
tection of the bankruptcy laws. 
The plan of reorganization also can 
restructure the amount, nature, and 
maturities of claims against the debtor 
and provide for the orderly payment of 
these restructured claims. Chapter II, 
therefore, can affect the entire nature 
of a debtor and its rlclationsilip with 
creditors. 
Evcry debtor and its relationship 
with creditors is unique. For that rea-
Ion, the laws of Chapter II neither 
mandate that every plan or reorganiza-
tion be the same or even similar nor 
thai the steps taken to reach a pl~ 
of reorganization be the same. The 
essence of Chapter II is a consensus 
process through which the debtor and 
hs creditors, represented for adminis-
trative convenience by the creditors' 
comminee, negotiate and compromise 
their way along the path to reorganiza-
tion. 
It would, of course, be more: efficient 
if, instead of neKotiation, the debtor 
(or, alternalively, the creditors) alone 
made: the decisions at each step. How-
ever, 10 permit that would lose sight of 
the two primary, but conflicting, goals 
Bankruptcy 
of bankruptcy. On the one hand, bank-
ruptcy recognizes that assets of Ihe 
debtor should be distributed for Ihe 
benefit of creditors. On Ihe other hand, 
it also recognizes lhat the debtor should 
be given a good faith opportunity to 
reorganize its business. The Chapter J J 
consensus process described above is 
an anempt to recognize and give effect 
to both of these important but some-
times conflicting goals. 
BEGINNING A 
CHAPTER 11 CASE 
A company having significant finan-
cial difficulties, especially cash flow 
problems, might consider filing a peti-
lion for Chapter i I to obtain the protec-
tiona that the law gives to debtors. The 
stigma associa.ted with bankruptcy has 
le~sened to some degree, particularly 
since large and relatively viable com-
panies, such as Manville Corporation, 
LTV Corporation, Texaco In~., and 
Continental Air Lines; have used 
Chapter 11 as II way of anempting to 
restructure their debts. 
Also, many business people mis-
takenly do not think of Chapter II as 
involving bankruptcy. A comp~ny may 
also be forced by ils creditors into 
Chapter II if certain legal standards are 
violated, such as the company's gen-
erally not paying its debts as they come 
due.! 
Often, the company and its creditors 
do not think through all of the conse-
quences of filing for Chapter I J. The 
most immediate and obvious conse-
quence for creditors is that all rights of 
creditors to take actions to collect debts 
or foreclose on collateral are immedi-
'S J03(h). 
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ately and automatically suspe~ded, or 
staYed.) This is one of the most far-
reaching provisions of bankruptcy law 
and is intended to give the debtor an 
opportunity to rehabilitate itself. The 
stay remains in effeci throughout the 
bankruptcy case unless the court, after 
a hearing, lifts it for a particular 
creditor because that creditor has 
satisfied specific legal standards appli-
cable to lifting the stay.4 Lifting the 
automatic stay docs not often occur. 
Creditors' Committee 
As already mentioned, one impor-
tant consequence of a Chapter II case is 
that the debtor and the debtor's rela-
tionship with ilS creditors and other 
third parties will become subject to the 
supervision of a bankruptcy judge and 
a bankruptcy trustee. One of the first 
impor&aDt ac,ions of the trustee is to 
appoint a creditors' comminee.~ The 
law specifics ordinarily that the 
creditors holding the seven largest 
claim .. , if they a'·e willing to serve, arc 
appointed to .. committee,· but, in 
practice, the trustee will try to make 
the comminee representative of the 
claims ;n the bankruptcy case. In major 
bankruptcies, it is not uncommon to 
sec comminees with as many as a dozen 
or more members. Typically, represen-
tatives of banks, insurance company 
lenders. and trade creditors will domi-
nate the committee. Often trustees for 
publicly issued debt securities (espe-
• , i62(1). 
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cially indenture trustees) will request 
appointment to a creditors' comminee 
to fulfill wliat they perceive as their 
legal obligation to act as a prudent man 
in times of default under the public 
debt securities. 
Creditors' Clash 
Appointmein of the creditors' com-
mince is one of the first occasions for a 
clash of interests. However, this lime 
the clash is not between the debtor and 
its creditors but among the creditors. 
Often institutional creditors, such as 
banks and insurance companies, want 
to recover their claims as quickly as 
feasible. Because there is a time value 
to money, a small face-value recovery 
obtained this year may be more valu-
able to an institutional ~reditor than a 
larger face-value .recovery obtained 
next year. The institutiona" creditors, 
therefore, arc likely to seck ways to 
obtain a quick recovery, and these ways 
might include anemplS to liquidate the 
debtor. Trade creditors, on the other 
hand, may have more of an interest in 
preserving the debtor as a viable busi-
ness entity, especially if the debtor is 
one of the trade creditor's important 
customers or suppliers. Therefore, ten-
sion is created at the outsel as to who 
-institutional or trade credilors-will 
dominate the creditors' committee. 
There arc Chapter 11 cases in which a 
single creditors' comminee is insuffi-
cientlo represent adequately the inler-
• See , 36l( d) . 
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ests of all the creditors. This sometimes 
occurs where certain claims against the 
debtor are contractually subordinated 
tOl!)ther (senior) claims against the 
debtor. The holders of the subordi-
nated claims may petition the bank-
ruptcy judge for a separate 1C0mminee 
to represent their special concerns. In 
some recent cases, separate comminees 
have been formed for competitors of 
the debtor where the: general creditors' 
comminee has acceu to sensitive com-
petitive information. 
Power of 
Creditors' Committees 
Creditors' committees arc powerful 
ernitiu. bin lheir power is thal of per· 
suasion. Although technically each In· 
dividual creditor has the legal right to 
be heard in court 'on each issue in a 
case, the judge will 'naturally give greal 
emphasis to the view of a court-
appointed credilors' com mince that is 
represeJ1tative of many claims in the 
case. Also. by law,' each crediton' 
committee has lhe power till hire legal 
counsel, accoumants, and business ad-
vilors (such as invest menu bankers) 
Ind to bav!! tile fees and llpenses of 
these experts paid directlY from the 
debtor's eslile. These elpcr" contri-
bute significantly to the value of wllat 
the creditors' comminee can say, and 
lhe commiuee ordinarily is not deter-
red by costs from doing a proper inves-
tigation and analysis of each issue in the 
casll:. 
, S 1I0)(al. 
• CcImpare S 1101 wilh S 1101. 
• S 1104(.). 
II S 1I000b). 
Management During 
Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy 
While in Chapter II, the debtor or-
dinarily will have the same manage-
ment as before bankruptcy.· There 
. is no requirement of law that pre-
bankruptcy management must resign, 
although officers and directors closely 
associated with ttic debtor prior to 
bankruptcy and whose credibility has 
been impaired by the bankruptcy may 
choose. to resign or may be forced out 
by creditor pressure. Sometimes in 
major cases, the debtor's board of di-
rectors will replace top management 
with one or more individuals who have 
partiqliar experience and skill in turn-
ins arpund troubled companies. 
In certain cases in which there has' 
been fraud or gross mismanagement, 
the court will consider arguments, if 
. advanced by creditors, for the ap-
pointment of a trustee-in-bankruptcy.' 
who would manage the debtor in lieu of 
its normal officers and directors. In 
pr.ctice, however, bankruptcy courts 
art reluctant to appoint trustees-in. 
bankruptty except in extreme cases. 
perhaps because they are reluctant 10 
lub.thute eouru-appointed experts in 
place of businessmen who know lhe 
debtor and its business. 
Wbe~ I trustee-in· bankruptcy II nOI 
appointed. the court may (and in a 
large case probably will) appoint an 
examiner. 10 The role of the examiner is 
not dearly defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code. Because of early abuses of the 
Filing Under Chapters 
examiner role, II it has become custom· 
ary in large cases for the creditors to 
select by consensus, at the outset of 
the case, a prominent lawyer of un-
questioned character who will act as 
examiner aC(:ording to a narrowly de-
fined charter of responsibilities pre-
pared by creditors and approved by the 
court. These responsibilities usually 
focus on the investigation offraudulent 
acts of management and third r'~rtic:s 
(for example, accountants) and the 
possibility of recovery from these per-
sons for the benefit of tbe debtor's es-
tate. "" In general, through ~ thuf»le of 
the examiner is in the process of beins 
established on a case-by-case basis. 
ADMINISTRATION OF " 
CHAPTER 11 CASE . 
An important goal for a Chapter II 
debtor is to obtain financing to permit 
the debtor to continue its business op-
erations. (As discussed, a debtor may 
operate: in Chapter II much as it docs 
outside of Chapter II but is subject to 
Ii~pervi$ion of the banltruptcy cQun.) 
Sometimes financing may not aClually 
be needed; the debtor will be atJle 10 
save money because il no lonser i, obli-
gated (0 pay i'" debt service on a cur· 
rent basisY Even in circumstances 
where the debtor docs not need to ob· 
tain new financing, however, it may 
83 
leek new financing to indicate 10 lrade 
creditors that since a financial institu-
tion has recognized the debtor as 
worthy of new credit, so, too, should 
trade creditors reestablish terms of 
trade credit with the debtor. 
Obtaining New Financing 
nle Bankruptcy Code grants far-
reaching powers 10 a debtor in Chapter 
11 to enable it to raise new financing. 
The court may srant the ncw lender a 
special priority on its claim for repay-
ment, ahead· of.lheclail11l pf other 
creditors not havins ,0Ilatenl. I ' If that 
is insufficient to allnCI polential new 
lenders. the court may elso Qrder that a 
lien be created on exislinl or afler· 
acquired properly of Ihe deblor 10 se· 
,uri r~paymCI\I of lb. pew loan. AI 
times, the debtor needs the new financ-
ing but has no unencumbered assets on 
which a lien can be granted of sufficient 
vz:lue to entice a potential lender. In 
such extraordinary circumstances, the 
court may order that a new lender re-
ceive a first lien on property Ihat is 
already Sl.Ib;ec:lIO aUen "e. ted prior to 
bankruptcy. 14 
SometimOl new finall':in, i, P8'O-
vide4 by ~n eliltins lender. A. an in· 
ducement to the existin, lender to 
mak. new advances, the debtor may 
offer 10 s!!cure both the lender's exist-
" for caomplc. in one bankruplCY case in whicb .he aUlhor putkiplued ,Ibe ludiC Ippoialed bit CGllcllue 
ellminer and Iricd 10 run Ihe ClK Ihruulb Ibe C&lI1Iincr, Illintn ill clillqll'd ohbe iIllerall eaprcucd b, 
Ih' deblor and "coIil"n. . . 
UA For ... mplc. on caaminer WII appoinled in Ibe A.H. Robina cue II Ibe requCl! ~. COPlPlIIICC of 
penonal injury plainliffs wbo Illcled wrun,rul conduct on lbe pari a1lbe CGmpan, I _lIcmeDl. 
II Sec Ih. pr •• ious d;scuuion of Ihe IUlomllk Ill, uncler , )62. 
" S 364. 
,. S •• S 364(d). tn .uch ClK,Ihe ",ebankruptcy lencler would baYe 10 receive ndcqUIIC proleClion Dr bia 
claim. 
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ing claim (to the extent it is not already 
secured) and hs claim for the new ad-
vances. Such an arrangement, known 
as cross-collateralization, is subjecI to 
court approval, which may be: granted 
afler nOlice and Ii hearing. 
A debtor's allempllo oblain new fin-
ancing during a Chapter II case can 
raise many problems. Of particular in-
terest is the tension between a debtor 
that wants new financing to purchase 
inventory to manufacture new prod-
ucts and a creditor who would prefer 
that no new claims, equal to or ahead of 
his own claim, be created by the in~ 
currence of the new financing. The 
creditor probably will not be sym-
palhelic to the desire of a debtor to 
manufacture more inventory thaI may 
not be readily salabli:. 
Making Money 
Once the debtor has obtained needed 
financing and reestablished lines of 
Irade credit, it can begin to turn its 
anent ion to the job of making money. 
Because a company known to be in 
Chapter II is unlikely, at least al the 
outset of the case, to be in a position to 
expand hs markels, the usual focus is 
on reducing operating costs and selling 
unneeded assets. 
The debtor will often relain accoun-
lants to help identify areas where costs 
can be reduced and to institute controls 
on the incurrence of future costs. For 
example, a particular manufacturing 
plant might, under close scrutiny, be 
found to be obsolescent; the debtor 
could save significant cos IS by shulling 
"S162 
It i J6)(d). 
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it down and terminating the em-
ployees. 
Investmenl bankers may also be re-
tained, especially in large cases, to 
identify major assets, divisions, and 
subsidiaries 10 sell. An example might 
be the sale of a division with an unre-
lated product. The debtor might not 
have the managemenl skills 10 make 
the division profitahie, but the product 
itself may have considerable commer-
cial value. The division could be sold to 
a company having expertise in that 
product. The happy result is that the 
debtor would receive value for selling a 
division which previously was a cash 
drain, and the division would be man-
aged by a'new company having the ex-
pertise to render it profitable. 
Third.Party Contracts 
The ultimate goal of the debtor and 
its creditors is 10 reduce costs and gain 
effective control of the businel'S suffi-
ciently so that it becomes feasible 10 
propose a plan for financial reorganiza-
tion. Achieving this goal almosl cer-
tainly will lake months, and in a large 
case, could take years. During that 
time. third parties having contracts 
with Ihe debtor may want to enforce 
Ihese contraclS, but they are prevented 
from doing so by the automatic stay, 
already discussed above. IS There is a 
procedure by which parties to contracts 
can allempl to compel the debtor to 
decide whether or not to accept, or as-
sume, Ihese contracts. III In practice, 
however, a court is reluctanllo compel 
the debtor to choose to assume or reject 
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a contract prior to the plan of reorgani-
zation if the debtor has convincing ar-
guments that it cannot properly make 
that decision before it thinks through 
the requirements of its plan of reor-
ganization. 
The debtor does, however, have the 
right under the Bankruptcy Code 10 
reject a contract al any lime if Ihe 
debtor can show that conlinued per-
formance is not in its business inter-
cstS.11 If a conlract is rejecled. the 
debtor no longer must perform its obli-
gations thereunder but will be liable for 
damages for breach of conlracl. How-
ever, the damage claim against the 
debtor will be a general unsecured 
claim and not be entitled to any special 
priorities in bankruptcy. 
The deblor also has the righl to 
affirm, or assume, a conlracl Ihat it 
regards as advantageous, even if the 
contract, by its terms. lerminates iii 
case of bankruptcy. For example. as-
sume the debtor has a contract with 
ABC Company to purchase widgets at 
$5 per widget. The price of widgets has 
increased 10 $7 per widget. The debtor 
could, if it cures the defaults under this 
contract (olher than defaults generally 
relaling to bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
financial condition) and provides ade-
q uate assurance of fUlUre performance, 
assume this contracl and thereby ob-
lain the benefit of the $2 per widget 
favorable price differential. This is a 
powerful right .>Cthe debtor to preserve 
¥5 
the benefil of long-Ierm advantageous 
contracts. The debtor even hal Ihe 
right to assign or sell these contracls to 
third parlies." 
PLAN OF 
REORGANIZATION 
Once the debtor has managed to con-
trol its costs and stabilize ils business 
operations, it will begin considering 
how to structure its plan of reorganiza-
tion. The chief purpose of the plan is to 
f@ffilate the contractual relationship be-
tween the debtor and its creditors in a 
manner that will 'allow the debtor to 
og;cll'ate as a viable company outside of 
thw protections of Chapter II. 
fhe debtor has the exclusive right to 
propose a plan of reorganizalion for the 
first 120 days after the bankruptcy 
commences. l • In large cases. Ihis is 
rarely enough time. and the court may 
extend this period of exclusivity for 
sufficient periods to allow the debtor 
time 10 control costs and stabilize the 
busincss.zo The debtor has a period of 
exclusivity because it was recognized 
that it would be awkward to allow 
creditors the right to file separate plans. 
without firsl giving the debtor the righl 
to file its own plan. ll 
In a typical plan of reorganization, 
each of Ihe claims againsl lhe debtor 
incurred prior 10 bankruptcy would be 
classified according 10 the Bankruptcy 
Code. Holders of general unsecured 
claims might. for example, receive 
., S J65(1). This rilhl only c .. endllo Ihe reicclion of ue"'lory eonulas; mil is, coalrlell where mllerial 
perrormance il IliII due on bolh lida. 
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rClarll ror rchlbililltion or Ihe lIeblor. 
84 
ing claim (to the extent it is not already 
secured) and hs claim for the new ad-
vances. Such an arrangement, known 
as cross-collateralization, is subjecI to 
court approval, which may be: granted 
afler nOlice and Ii hearing. 
A debtor's allempllo oblain new fin-
ancing during a Chapter II case can 
raise many problems. Of particular in-
terest is the tension between a debtor 
that wants new financing to purchase 
inventory to manufacture new prod-
ucts and a creditor who would prefer 
that no new claims, equal to or ahead of 
his own claim, be created by the in~ 
currence of the new financing. The 
creditor probably will not be sym-
palhelic to the desire of a debtor to 
manufacture more inventory thaI may 
not be readily salabli:. 
Making Money 
Once the debtor has obtained needed 
financing and reestablished lines of 
Irade credit, it can begin to turn its 
anent ion to the job of making money. 
Because a company known to be in 
Chapter II is unlikely, at least al the 
outset of the case, to be in a position to 
expand hs markels, the usual focus is 
on reducing operating costs and selling 
unneeded assets. 
The debtor will often relain accoun-
lants to help identify areas where costs 
can be reduced and to institute controls 
on the incurrence of future costs. For 
example, a particular manufacturing 
plant might, under close scrutiny, be 
found to be obsolescent; the debtor 
could save significant cos IS by shulling 
"S162 
It i J6)(d). 
Bankruptcy 
it down and terminating the em-
ployees. 
Investmenl bankers may also be re-
tained, especially in large cases, to 
identify major assets, divisions, and 
subsidiaries 10 sell. An example might 
be the sale of a division with an unre-
lated product. The debtor might not 
have the managemenl skills 10 make 
the division profitahie, but the product 
itself may have considerable commer-
cial value. The division could be sold to 
a company having expertise in that 
product. The happy result is that the 
debtor would receive value for selling a 
division which previously was a cash 
drain, and the division would be man-
aged by a'new company having the ex-
pertise to render it profitable. 
Third.Party Contracts 
The ultimate goal of the debtor and 
its creditors is 10 reduce costs and gain 
effective control of the businel'S suffi-
ciently so that it becomes feasible 10 
propose a plan for financial reorganiza-
tion. Achieving this goal almosl cer-
tainly will lake months, and in a large 
case, could take years. During that 
time. third parties having contracts 
with Ihe debtor may want to enforce 
Ihese contraclS, but they are prevented 
from doing so by the automatic stay, 
already discussed above. IS There is a 
procedure by which parties to contracts 
can allempl to compel the debtor to 
decide whether or not to accept, or as-
sume, Ihese contracts. III In practice, 
however, a court is reluctanllo compel 
the debtor to choose to assume or reject 
Filing Under Chapters 
a contract prior to the plan of reorgani-
zation if the debtor has convincing ar-
guments that it cannot properly make 
that decision before it thinks through 
the requirements of its plan of reor-
ganization. 
The debtor does, however, have the 
right under the Bankruptcy Code 10 
reject a contract al any lime if Ihe 
debtor can show that conlinued per-
formance is not in its business inter-
cstS.11 If a conlract is rejecled. the 
debtor no longer must perform its obli-
gations thereunder but will be liable for 
damages for breach of conlracl. How-
ever, the damage claim against the 
debtor will be a general unsecured 
claim and not be entitled to any special 
priorities in bankruptcy. 
The deblor also has the righl to 
affirm, or assume, a conlracl Ihat it 
regards as advantageous, even if the 
contract, by its terms. lerminates iii 
case of bankruptcy. For example. as-
sume the debtor has a contract with 
ABC Company to purchase widgets at 
$5 per widget. The price of widgets has 
increased 10 $7 per widget. The debtor 
could, if it cures the defaults under this 
contract (olher than defaults generally 
relaling to bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
financial condition) and provides ade-
q uate assurance of fUlUre performance, 
assume this contracl and thereby ob-
lain the benefit of the $2 per widget 
favorable price differential. This is a 
powerful right .>Cthe debtor to preserve 
¥5 
the benefil of long-Ierm advantageous 
contracts. The debtor even hal Ihe 
right to assign or sell these contracls to 
third parlies." 
PLAN OF 
REORGANIZATION 
Once the debtor has managed to con-
trol its costs and stabilize ils business 
operations, it will begin considering 
how to structure its plan of reorganiza-
tion. The chief purpose of the plan is to 
f@ffilate the contractual relationship be-
tween the debtor and its creditors in a 
manner that will 'allow the debtor to 
og;cll'ate as a viable company outside of 
thw protections of Chapter II. 
fhe debtor has the exclusive right to 
propose a plan of reorganizalion for the 
first 120 days after the bankruptcy 
commences. l • In large cases. Ihis is 
rarely enough time. and the court may 
extend this period of exclusivity for 
sufficient periods to allow the debtor 
time 10 control costs and stabilize the 
busincss.zo The debtor has a period of 
exclusivity because it was recognized 
that it would be awkward to allow 
creditors the right to file separate plans. 
without firsl giving the debtor the righl 
to file its own plan. ll 
In a typical plan of reorganization, 
each of Ihe claims againsl lhe debtor 
incurred prior 10 bankruptcy would be 
classified according 10 the Bankruptcy 
Code. Holders of general unsecured 
claims might. for example, receive 
., S J65(1). This rilhl only c .. endllo Ihe reicclion of ue"'lory eonulas; mil is, coalrlell where mllerial 
perrormance il IliII due on bolh lida. 
II S 36S(O. 
,. S 1I··(b). 
,. S IIlI(d). 
/. One could imlline Ihl' I credilor', plan _uld focus on repllYlllenl in ruu or claiml, wlthoul IU/ficicn. 
rClarll ror rchlbililltion or Ihe lIeblor. 
86 
payment of their claims through a 
c(lmbination of cash and long-term 
debt instruments or equity securities. 
Holders of claims subordinated @o gen-
eral unsecured claims would probably 
receive a significantly lesser value per 
dollar of claim. Claims of other classifi-
cations would be expected to receive 
more or less, depending on the relative 
rlanking of the claims illl a bankruptcy 
Iiquidalionu and, therefore, the rela-
dve negotiating strength of creditors 
holding these claims. 
Key to Successful Plan 
The key to a successful plan of reor-
ganwtion is that it be consensual. That 
means, in practice, that each class of 
claims must receive enough value for 
hs claims to persuade tine class to vote 
affirmatively for the plan. The: Bank-
ruptcy Code contains certain ,induce-
ments to consensus. Perhaps the most 
important and well known is the so-
called cramdown provision. lJ In es-
licnce, this provision maintains the fol-
lowing: 
I. A junior class (for example, a class 
t;)f subordinated claims or a class of 
lequity interests) will be legally deemed 
~o have accepted a plan of reorganiza-
don which provides that no class senior 
10 it receives, in the plan, value worth 
more than 100% of the claims repre-
sented by such senior c1ass.14 
II Cum pare S 726(1) . 
.. , ll29(b) . 
Bankruptcy 
2. No class junior to it receives any 
value on account of its claims or inter-
ests. 
Cramdown Principle 
Consider a class of general unsecured 
daimants receiving cash and debt secu-
rities valued at 100% of the general un-
secured claims. Those claimants may 
!be able to cram down a plan of reor-
ganization over the objection of a class 
of subordinated public debentures as 
long as no class of claims or interests 
junior to Ihe subordinated public de-
bentures receives value under the plan 
of reorganization. 
Although in principle cramdown 
sounds like a powerful tool, in practice, 
it would require a hearing to value the 
debtor's assets and the benefits re-
ceived by the senior claimants to ensure 
that no senior claimants receive more 
than 100% of their claims. A valuation 
hearing of this sorl can be very expen-
sive and time consuming and will al-
most certainly result in prolonged liti-
gation as to whether the valuation was 
properly done. Therefore, cramdown 
is most important as a threat to induce 
junior classes of creditors to accept a 
plan ofreorganization proposed by the 
debtor or by senior creditors, since 
there is a theoretical risk that the junior 
class could receivl: much less in a cram-
down. On the other hand, the difficulty 
caused by the valuation hearing is also 
.. The ""ncepllhll ~ .cn.ior diU rcc.iva no more Ihlll 100% 01 il' dlim, is nol ,el fDrlh in' IIl9(b) bUI is 
de .. from Ihe leallll .. ve hISIOr}'. Sce HOUle of Reprelenilliv .. Rc""n No. )') 'Slh eo",. III S-. 
41).18 (1977). • • -•. 
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an inducement to Ihe debtor and 
holders of senior claims to offer a rea-
sonable proposal to the holders of 
junior claims.lS 
CONCl.USION 
There are many other important 
considerations in a Chapter 11 case not 
mentioned in this overview. For exam-
ple, one of the most valuable assets of 
a bankrupt company frequently is its 
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federal income tax attributes. Most 
bankrupt companies operate It a loss 
for several years prior to bankruptcy 
and, therefore. typically will have 
significant carryovers to fUIUre tax 
years for nel operating and capilal 
losses and investment tax credits. The 
manner in which the bankrupl com-
pany is restruclured should be tailored 
to maximize and preserve these carry-
overs. • 
" Thai il why, for Cli ,'ple, subordinllcd crcdilon in bankruplC)' .re oilen able to recov" I ""nioa on their 
cl. ;ms .. en lhou' n .enior credilon hue nol bten paid in full. 
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